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THE REPEAL OF GENERAL UTILITIES FOR CORPORATE
LIQUIDATIONS - THE CONSEQUENCES OF INCOMPLETE
AND UNEXPECTED TAX REFORM
by
Louis F. LOBENHOFER*
The rules of corporate taxation are an integrated whole. If changes are
made to certain of the basic provisions - for example, the rule of General
Utilities - those changes will reverberate throughout the system. Some
provisions previously thought necessary to prevent abuse may no longer
be relevant; others may have to be redrawn and strengthened. According-
ly, we believe that a fundamental restructuring must take into account all
collateral consequences.'
INTRODUCTION
"The General Utilities rule provide[d], with certain exceptions, that a cor-
poration [did] not recognize gain or loss upon the distribution of property to its
shareholders with respect to [their] stock."2 An example may help to clarify the
operation of the General Utilities doctrine in corporate liquidations. T Corp.
has one shareholder, J, an individual. J owns stock in T Corp. with a basis of
$10 and a fair market value of $100. T Corp. owns one asset, Blacklot, a piece
of undeveloped land, with a basis of $20 and a fair market value of $100. If J
causes T Corp. to dissolve and to distribute its assets to J in complete liquida-
tion, J would recognize gain of $90 in J's stock.3 The General Utilities doctrine,
codified in Section 336 of the Internal Revenue Code,' generally provided that
T Corp. would recognize no gain or loss upon distributing its asset in liquida-
tion. J would receive T Corp.'s land, however, at a basis equal to the fair
market value of the land,5 $100, even though the $80 gain in the T Corp. asset
was not recognized in the liquidation.
*Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University. A.B. College of William and Mary, 1972; J.D., University of
Colorado, 1975; LL.M. (Taxation), University of Denver, 1979. The author gratefully acknowledges the
help of his research assistants, Michael Discafani and Patrick Svonavek, students at the Pettit College of
Law, Ohio Northern University, in the preparation of this article.
IREFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION: HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 28 (1983) [hereinafter REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION] (statement of Ronald Pearlnan, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of Treasury).
'Shube, Corporate Income or Loss on Distributions of Property: An Analysis of General Utilities, 12 J.
CORP. TAX'N, 3 (1985).
'l.R.C. § 331(a) (1985).
'.R.C. § 336(a) (1985), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631(a), - Stat.
(1986). Hereafter, the portions of this Act that amended the Internal Revenue Code will be cited as I.R.C. of
1986, § _. Provisions of the Act not made a part of the Internal Revenue Code will be cited as Tax Reform
Act of 1986, § _.
'I.R.C. § 334(a) (1985).
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Section 337 of the Code, a companion rule to Section 336, provided that,
if T Corp. adopted a plan of liquidation, sold its asset, and then liquidated
within twelve months after the adoption of the plan of liquidation, T Corp.
would recognize no gain on the sale of the land.6 Finally, if J sold his T Corp.
stock to P Corp., P Corp. could elect under Section 338 to increase the basis of
the T Corp. asset to $100 while only recognizing the gain that would have been
recognized by T Corp. if it had sold its asset in a Section 337 transaction.7 In
this example, no gain would be recognized.
After much discussion in the context of a more comprehensive revision of
the corporate tax rules,8 Congress repealed the last remaining vestiges of the
General Utilities doctrine in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 9
The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine had been discussed in profes-
sional and governmental circles for many years."0 The General Utilities doc-
trine had long been excoriated by many commentators as the source of com-
plexity, confusion, and distortion of the federal income tax laws." Over time
Congress attempted to limit the revenue loss and distortions caused by the
General Utilities doctrine by enacting amendments to Subchapter C and other
parts of the Internal Revenue Code to create more and more exceptions to the
General Utilities doctrine. In 1984 the doctrine was almost entirely abolished
with respect to nonliquidating distributions. 2 Beginning with the first draft of
the American Law Institute (ALl) study of Subchapter C of the Internal
Revenue Code in 1977,13 reform proposals had specifically focused on the
possible repeal of the General Utilities doctrine with regard to acquisitions and
liquidations. Basing its work on the proposals of the ALl study, the Senate
Finance Committee also prepared comprehensive proposals for revision of the
corporate acquisition rules including repeal of the doctrine. 4
In both the ALI study and the Senate Finance Committee Staff proposals,
the repeal of General Utilities was a part of a larger effort to revise the rules
61.R.C. § 337(a) (1985).
I.R.C. § 338(a) (1985).
'See, e.g., STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM ON FINANCE. 99TH CONG., IST SESS., THE SUBCHAPTER C REVISION
ACT OF 1985 47 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter SUBCHAPTER C REVISION ACTI.
'Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 633(d).
"'See Lewis, A Proposed New Treatment for Corporate Distributions and Sales in Liquidation, in 3 TAX
REVISION COMPENDIUM SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE 1643 (Comm. Print 1959)
(one of the first critiques of the General Utilities doctrine).
"E.g., Blum, Taxing Transfers of Incorporated Businesses: A Proposal for Improvement, 52 TAXES 516
(1974); Wolfman, Corporate Distributions of Appreciated Property: The Case for Repeal of the General
Utilities Doctrine, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 81 (1985); Watts, Recognition of Gain or Loss to a Corporation on
a Distribution of Property in Exchange for Its Own Stock. 22 TAX LAW. 161, 191-92 (1968).
"See TAX REFORM BILl. OF 1985, TEXT OF H.R. 3838 REPORTED BY THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM.
AND REPORT OF THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM. H.R. REP. No. 99-426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 281-82
(1985),
"ALI, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C, (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1977).
14STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., THE REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION OFTHE
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 2 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter REFORM].
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REPEAL OF THE GENERAL UTILITIES DOCTRINE
governing corporate acquisitions. 5 The reform proposals also contained relief
provisions intended to soften the adverse consequences of the repeal of the
doctrine to various taxpayers. 6 In addition, most government proposals con-
tained provisions that classified publicly traded Master Limited Partnerships as
corporations, instead of partnerships, for tax purposes." In summary, the
repeal of the General Utilities doctrine was carefully considered by experts,
both in and out of government, and found by many to be a necessary step in
reforming the tax laws governing corporations and shareholders.
The discussions and proposals of the reformers assumed that many of the
major features of the income tax system would stay in place. The proposals
usually assumed that the present two-tier structure of taxing corporations and
shareholders would be retained. 8 Most of the reformers also assumed that
some form of favorable treatment for capital gains transactions would remain
as a part of the income tax system for both individuals and corporations."
The repeal of the General Utilities rule in corporate liquidations was final-
ly accomplished in the Tax Reform Act of 1986,2o one of the most sweeping
Tax Reform bills in the history of the income tax. The repeal accomplished
many of the goals of the reformers, but because the abolition of the General
Utilities doctrine was not accompanied by the necessary complementary
amendments to other sections, and because it was accompanied by the aboli-
tion of capital gains,2' the repeal has some unexpected and unfortunate conse-
quences. This article will first discuss the history of the General Utilities doc-
trine and its gradual demise. Second, it will summarize the provision, noting
both relief provisions and provisions designed to prevent tax avoidance under
the new rules. Finally, this article will compare the effects of legislation to the
justifications that prompted its enactment and discuss its side-effects.
I. HISTORY OF THE GENERAL UTILITIES DOCTRINE
According to its critics, the General Utilities doctrine has caused confu-
sion and complexity in corporate tax law. Not surprisingly, its history is also
complex and somewhat confusing. The General Utilities doctrine existed long
before the case was decided that gave the doctrine its name. The doctrine took
its name from a case which probably did not decide a "General Utilities" issue.
In addition, the doctrine had undergone a process of gradual erosion for a
"ALI Proposals on Corporate Acquisitions and Dispositions and Reporter's Study on Corporate Distribu-
tions 12-13 (1982) [hereinafter ALl, Proposals]; see also SUBCHAPTER C REVISION ACT. supra note 8.
6Leduc, Current Proposals to Restructure the Taxation of Corporate Acquisitions and Dispositions:
Substance and Process, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 17, 47-48 (1985).
"REFORM, supra note 14, at 7.
"ALI, Proposals, supra note 15, at 12.
"Id. at 14.
"Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 631.
"Tax Reform Act of 1986, §§ 301, 311.
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number of years before its final repeal in 1986.
The current federal income tax on corporations began in 1909, before the
Sixteenth Amendment was ratified, and did not depend on the amendment for
its constitutionality. When the income tax on individuals was enacted, the
double taxation of corporate income was almost an accidental consequence of
treating corporate dividends as income to individual recipients." While the law
contained a double tax on the distributed profits of corporate operations, only
a single tax, if any, on the shareholder, burdened the formation or dissolution
of corporations. Liquidations "were regarded as mere changes in the form that
the distributed assets were held, and thus not as appropriate events for the im-
position of a tax."23 While the tax consequences of nonliquidating distributions
were not so clear, several cases decided before General Utilities established
that distributions of property were taxable only if the corporate resolution
declaring the dividend specified that the dividend was to be a sum of money,
and the property satisfied the debt created by the corporate resolution." Thus,
the principal features of the General Utilities doctrine were clearly established
before the Supreme Court decided the General Utilities case in 1935.
The General Utilities case involved an attempt to escape the corporate
level tax on the sale of corporate assets, a fact pattern not unlike the later
Court Holding Company 5 and Cumberland Public Service26 cases. The
General Utilities Company had received an offer for the highly appreciated
stock that it held in a subsidiary corporation, Islands Edison Company. 7 To
avoid the corporate level tax, the parties agreed that the sale would occur only
after the stock had been distributed to the shareholders. 8 The Board of Direc-
tors of General Utilities passed a resolution directing the distribution of the
Islands Edison Company stock to the General Utilities shareholders; unfor-
tunately, the dividend resolution was ambiguous and could be read as directing
either a cash dividend to be satisfied with stock or a distribution of the stock.29
The Commissioner argued that a cash dividend had been declared and that the
resulting debt had been satisfied with appreciated property.3" The Board of Tax
Appeals found that the dividend resolution contemplated a distribution of
stock, resulting in no realization of gain.' The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed on an argument not made before the Board of Tax Appeals, that
"
2Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.
90, 91-92, 100 (1977).
2 Shube, supra note 2, at 5.
2
1ld. at 7-9.
2 Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
"
TUnited States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
"General Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 201-02 (1935).
"lid. at 202.
"d.
"'General Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 29 B.T.A. 934, 938 (1934).
3"Id. at 940.
[Vol. 4
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REPEAL OF THE GENERAL UTILiTIEs DOCTRINE
the corporation had, in substance, sold the stock before it was distributed to
the shareholders, and thus that the gain was realized by the corporation.32
Before the Supreme Court, the Commissioner presented yet a third theory,
that a corporation always realized gain when it distributed appreciated proper-
ty to its shareholders." The Supreme Court clearly rejected the theory relied
upon by the Fourth Circuit on the grounds that the argument was "not proper-
ly raised."3 The Commissioner's argument that corporations always recognize
gain on a distribution of property was not discussed by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court merely upheld the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals,
stating that: "Both tribunals below rightly decided that petitioner derived no
taxable gain from the distribution among its stockholders of the Islands Edison
shares as a dividend. This was no sale; assets were not used to discharge indebt-
edness."35
While the language of the Court in upholding the Board was broad, most
commentators believe that the Court did not intend to reject the Commis-
sioner's realization argument or to establish a blanket doctrine of nonrecogni-
tion. 6 The lower courts, however, treated the General Utilities case as
establishing the principle that corporations recognized no gain on the distribu-
tion in kind of their appreciated property.37
The erosion of the General Utilities doctrine, like its existence, began even
before the Supreme Court's decision gave the doctrine its name. Section 44(d)
of the Revenue Act of 1928 provided that the distribution of an installment
obligation would cause gain recognition.38 Continuing the erosion after the
General Utilities decision, the Court Holding Company case limited the doc-
trine when the corporation had arranged for a sale before liquidating. 9
Taxpayers then discovered that they could avoid the burden of ordinary
income at the corporate level from some business ventures, such as the produc-
tion of motion pictures, by forming a "collapsible" corporation for one venture,
then selling their stock in the corporation or liquidating the corporation before
'
2Helvering v. General Utils. & Operating Co., 74 F.2d 972, 975-76 (4th Cir. 1935).
"General Utils., 296 U.S. at 203-06.
1 Id. at 206.
35Id.
'E.g., B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 7.21
at 50-59 (4th ed. 1979).
"See generally Molloy, Some Tax Aspects of Corporate Distributions in Kind, 6 TAX L. REV. 57, 59 nn.
15-18 (1950).
"Pub. L. No. 70-562, § 852, 45 Stat. 79 (1928). The provision is quoted in Shube, supra note 2, at 5-6.
"Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). Taxpayers could escape the sweep of the Court
Holding Co. case by liquidating first and then negotiating the sale of the company's assets. United States v.
Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950). To prevent these rules from becoming a trap for the un-
wary, and to de-emphasize the form of sale and liquidation transactions, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 337 in
1954, permitting the corporation to adopt a plan of liquidation and sell its assets tax-free, so long as the cor-
poration completed its liquidation within twelve months after the adoption of the liquidation plan. I.R.C. §
337(a) (1985). See also Shube, supra note 2, at 14.
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realizing the ordinary income from the venture.4° Congress responded by
creating the elaborate and confusing collapsible corporation rules designed to
penalize shareholders making use of the collapsible corporation.4 The overly-
complex collapsible corporation rules are one of the most unfortunate side-
effects of the General Utilities doctrine.
In the comprehensive recodification of the Internal Revenue Code in
1954, Congress grouped the rules applicable to corporations in Subchapter C,
but the codification occurred without any systematic examination or analysis
of the corporate tax rules. 42 The new code embodied the General Utilities prin-
ciple for distributions in liquidation in Sections 336 and 337 and for nonliq-
uidating distributions in Section 31 1.4 The enactment of the General Utilities
principle in Section 311 continued the erosion of the doctrine, because the sec-
tion contained two new exceptions to the principle of nonrecognition." Several
later tax bills provided further exceptions, such as depreciation recapture, to
the rule of nonrecognition for both current distributions and distributions in
liquidation.45 By 1983, corporations recognized gain on most distributions of
appreciated assets in redemption of their stock. 6
The 1984 Tax Reform Act completed the process of abolishing the
General Utilities doctrine for most nonliquidating corporate distributions by
requiring that corporations recognize gain on ordinary distributions of ap-
41B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 36, 12.01.
4I1 .R.C. § 341 (1985). First enacted in 1950 as § 117(m) of the 1939 Code, it has been repeatedly amended,
adding complexity at each step. For thorough summaries of its provisions and their operation, see Ginsburg,
Collapsible Corporations - Revisiting an Old Misfortune, 33 TAX L. REV. 309 n. 3 (1978), and Holden, The
Collapsible Corporation: What, Why, How; Understanding the Creature as a Protection against Unfor-
tunate Tax Results, 34 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 11 (1976).
"
2Leduc, supra note 16, at 23.
31I.R.C. §§ 336, 337, 311 (1954).
"I.R.C. § 311 (b) (1954) provided that gain would be recognized on distributions of LIFO inventory, and §
311 (c) required gain recognition in the case of property distributed subject to a liability in excess of basis.
I.R.C. § 311 (a) continued the rule requiring the recognition of gain on the distribution of installment obliga-
tions. See Leduc, supra note 16, at 24 n. 37.
"The recapture provisions, beginning with § 1245 added to the Code in 1962, require that deductions or
credits be recaptured on liquidation. E.g., I.R.C. § 1245(a), Pub. L. 87-834 § 13(a), 76 Stat. 1032; Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1245-6(b) (as amended by T.D. 6832, 1965-2 C.B. 292, 316). The Tax Reform Act of 1969 added §
311(d)(1), requiring a corporation to recognize gain when appreciated property was distributed to a
shareholder in a stock redemption, with several exceptions. P.L. 91-172, § 905(b), 83 Stat. 713-14. The Crude
Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1980 added § 336(b) to the Code, requiring recapture in cases of distributions
of LIFO inventory in liquidation. P.L. 96-223, § 403(b), 94 Stat. 304-05. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Respon-
sibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) limited the avoidance of corporate level gain recognition (with a step-up in
basis) in partial liquidations to noncorporate distributees and repealed some of the exceptions to corporate
level gain recognition in redemption of stock. P.L. 97-248, §§ 222(c) & (d), 223(a), 96 Stat. 478-480, 483-84
(1982). In the Subchapter S Revision Act, Congress provided that gain would be recognized in distributions
of property by S corporations. I.R.C. § 1363(d), enacted in P.L. 97-354, § 2, 96 Stat. 1676.
'See Ward, The TEFRA Amendments to Subchapter C: Corporate Distributions and Acquisitions, 8 J.
CORP. L. 277, 278 (1983). For other general discussions of the TEFRA reforms, see Ginsburg, Taxing Cor-
porate Acquisitions, 38 TAX L. REV. 171 (1983), and Ferguson & Stiver, Taxable Corporate Acquisitions
After TEFRA, 42 INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 12.06 (1984).
[Vol. 4
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REPEAL OF THE GENERAL UTILITIES DOCTRINE
preciated property to shareholders.47 After the 1984 Act, a corporation
distributing appreciated property to its shareholders in a non-liquidating
distribution generally recognized the gain inherent in 'the distributed
property." Only the following distributions qualified for nonrecognition by the
distributing corporation: qualified dividends,49 distributions in partial liquida-
tion to noncorporate distributees," distributions of the securities of controlled
corporations,51 stock redemptions to pay death taxes or the administrative ex-
penses of an estate, 2 certain redemptions of stock held by private
foundations,53 and distributions at the request of shareholders by regulated in-
vestment companies in redemption of their stock.54 After the 1984 Tax Reform
Act, the only vestiges of the General Utilities rule were the exceptions just
enumerated under Section 311 and the general rule of nonrecognition for
distributions in liquidation of corporations.
II. EXPLANATION OF PROVISION
The 1986 Tax Reform Act changes Section 336 so that gain and loss will
generally be recognized on the liquidating distribution of assets by a corpora-
tion to its shareholders.55 The new gain recognition rules have very few excep-
tions, leaving most of the opportunities to avoid gain recognition outside Sub-
chapter C.
The first exception, the so-called "related party anti-stuffing" rule,56
'I.R.C. § 311 (d), as amended by P.L. 98-369 § 54. The most important amendment to § 311 (d) required a
distributing corporation to recognize gain on ordinary distributions of property to "corporate distributees."
Belier & Palmer, The Corporate Side of Distributions to Shareholders: Sections 311 and 336, 43 INST. ON
FED. TAX'N (1984).
" l.R.C. § 311(d) (1985).
49A qualified dividend was a dividend paid to a noncorporate shareholder of property used in the active con-
duct of a trade or business, other than inventory or other property held for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business. I.R.C. § 311 (e)(3) (1985). Such a dividend had to be paid with respect to "qualified stock:"
stock held by a noncorporate shareholder for five years before the distribution. The shareholder of "qualified
stock" had to own at least "10 percent in value of the outstanding stock of the distributing corporation," in-
cluding stock attributed to the shareholder under I.R.C. § 318. I.R.C. § 31 l(e)(1) (1985).
"The distribution in partial liquidation had to be made with respect to "qualified stock," as defined in note
49. Such a distribution could only be made to a noncorporate shareholder. I.R.C. § 302(b)(4) (1985). In addi-
tion, the partial liquidation had to meet the requirements of § 302(e). The distribution could not "essentially
equivalent to a dividend," and it had to be made within the taxable year in which the plan of partial liquida-
tion was adopted or the succeeding taxable year. I.R.C. § 302(e)(1) (1985).
"Such a distribution had to be made with respect to "qualified stock" of a controlled corporation. I.R.C. §
31 l(e)(2)(A)(i) (1985). Substantially all of the assets the controlled corporation had to consist of the assets of a
qualified business - actively conducted for five years before the distribution and not acquired in a transac-
tion in which gain or loss was recognized. I.R.C. § 31 l(e)(2)(A)(ii) and (B)(i) (1985). The controlled corpora-
tion's nonbusiness assets could not have been acquired by contribution within five years of the distribution.
I.R.C. § 31 l(e)(2)(A)(iii) (1985). Finally, the distributing corporation had to distribute more than fifty percent
in value of the stock of the controlled corporation. I.R.C. § 31 1(e)(2)(A)(iv) (1985).
"1.R.C. § 31 l(d)(2)(C) (1985) (referring to I.R.C. § 303 redemptions).
"1.R.C. § 31 1(d)(2)(D) (referring to redemptions under § 537(b)(2)(A) and (B)).
1'1.R.C. § 311 (d)(2)(E).
"Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 63 1(a), amending I.R.C. § 336.
"Bonovitz, Impact of the TRA Repeal of General Utilities, 65 J. TAX'N 388 (1986).
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prevents taxpayers from causing the corporation to recognize losses by con-
tributing loss properties to the corporation and then distributing the recently
contributed loss properties to related shareholders in liquidation. 7 The loss will
be disallowed if either the liquidating distribution is not pro rata or if the prop-
erty is "disqualified property."58 If the corporation received the loss property in
a Section 351 transaction or as a contribution to capital "during the 5-year
period ending on the date of the distribution," 9 the property will be considered
disqualified property."
A stricter anti-stuffing rule reduces the basis of a loss property on sale, ex-
change, or distribution if the "principal purpose"'" of a contribution of proper-
ty was "to recognize loss by the liquidating corporation with respect to such
property in connection with the liquidation."62 For example, A owns 100% of
the stock of X Corp., which operates a retail store, and A contributes an asset
unrelated to the business of X Corp. with a basis of $100 and a fair market
value of $5. One month after A contributes the asset, X Corp. sells the asset to
B, an unrelated third party, for $5. Two months after the contribution, A
causes X to liquidate. Under new Section 336(d)(2), the basis of the contributed
asset will be reduced to $5, thereby disallowing X Corp.'s loss on the sale to B.
The forbidden contribution can either be a capital contribution or a Section
351 exchange of property for stock or securities between the shareholder and
the liquidating corporation.63 If the liquidating corporation acquires loss prop-
erty in a Section 351 exchange or as a capital contribution within two years
before the adoption of the plan of liquidation, it will be presumed that the con-
tribution was made as a part of a plan to recognize the loss in connection with
the liquidation.64
The real purpose of the basis reduction rule of Section 336(d)(2) is to pre-
vent abuses of the loss recognition rules of new Section 336 by the contribu-
tion of assets unrelated to the business operation of the liquidating corpora-
tion. Therefore, the regulations will not require a reduced basis in contributed
assets that are related to the business of the liquidating corporation. The con-
ferees appear to want the two-year presumption of bad intent to apply only
when "there is no clear and substantial relationship between the contributed
property and the conduct of the corporation's current or future business enter-
prises."65 The conferees also explained that the two-year presumption of planned
9l.R.C. of 1986, § 336(d).
SI.R.C. of 1986, § 336(d)(1)(A).
19 1.R.C. of 1986, § 336(d)(l)(B).
60
/d.
61I.R.C. of 1986, § 336(d)(2)(A).
6
1.R.C. of 1986, § 336(d)(2)(B)(i)(I1).
631.R.C. of 1986, § 336(d)(2)(B)(i)(1).
6I.R.C. of 1986, § 336(d)(2)(B)(ii).
65H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-201 (1986).
[Vol. 4
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loss recognition generally should not apply "to a corporation's acquisition of
property during its first two years of existence."66
As a further safeguard to prevent tax avoidance, new Section 336 permits
the Service to require recapture of the disallowed loss on a sale as gain by the
liquidating corporation as a part of its liquidation.67 In cases in which a loss
from contributed property was disallowed in a year before the year in which
the liquidating corporation adopted the plan of liquidation, regulations permit
the Service to convert the disallowed loss into gross income for the liquidating
corporation in the year of liquidation. 68 Such regulations could cause a bunch-
ing of income in the year of liquidation that could produce unusually high
taxes, particularly if it pushes the corporation's taxable income above
$100,000 for the taxable year. 69 This bunching could lead to an increase in the
corporation's tax rate to 39%, instead of the usual 34%.70
The conferees anticipated that taxpayers would try to avoid the burdens
imposed by new Section 336 by having corporations elect S corporation status
immediately before a distribution or liquidation to avoid the corporate level tax
altogether. Therefore, Congress closed the loophole before it appeared. If an S
corporation disposes of an asset within ten years after its S election, new Sec-
tion 1374 will cause the "recognized built-in gain" of the asset at the time the
corporation elected S status to be taxed at the highest corporate rates." New
Section 1374 assumes that any gain realized on a property distributed by the
corporation was present when the corporation elected S status." However, the
corporation may avoid the tax by proving that the asset was acquired after the
corporation elected S corporation status." Even if the corporation owned the
asset when the Subchapter S election was made, the corporation may minimize
the "built-in gain" by proving that the "built-in gain" was less than the dif-
ference between fair market value and adjusted basis at the date of
disposition.74 New Section 1374 does not apply to corporations that have been
S corporations since they were first organized" or to corporations that elected
to become S corporations before January 1, 1987.76 Therefore, corporations
that elected S corporation treatment before January 1, 1987, may have a
"Id.
"I.R.C. of 1986, § 336(d)(2)(C).
68jd.
61I.R.C. of 1986, § I I(b) provides for a 5% increase in the 34% top rate until the advantage of the tax rates
below 28% has been offset.
70Id.
N1 .R.C. of 1986, § 1374(a).
nI.R.C. of 1986, § 1374(d)(2).
73I.R.C. of 1986, § 1374(d)(2)(A).
4 I.R.C. of 1986, § 1374(d)(2)(B).
"I.R.C. of 1986, § 1374(c)(1).
"Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 633(b).
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special opportunity to liquidate at low tax cost by taking advantage of new Sec-
tion 1374 and the transitional rule for small corporations discussed below."
Another exception clarifies a point of apparent inconsistency between the
liquidation rules and the reorganization rules within Subchapter C before the
1986 Tax Reform Act. Before the amendment of Sections 336 and 337, tax-
payers argued that a corporation could sell unwanted assets to third parties
tax-free while the selling corporation was being acquired in a tax-free
reorganization.78 An example may help to clarify this discussion. P Corp.
wants to acquire all of the assets of T Corp. except for one asset not related to
T Corp.'s business operations. P Corp. is acquiring substantially all of the
assets of T Corp. for P Corp. voting stock, so the transaction qualifies as a tax-
free "C" reorganization.79 After transferring its assets to P Corp. for P. Corp.
stock, T Corp. will liquidate and distribute the P Corp. stock to the T Corp.
shareholders. After P Corp. and T Corp. have agreed to the transaction, T
Corp. adopts a plan of liquidation and sells the unwanted asset to A, an
unrelated third party. Before the 1986 Tax Reform Act, T Corp. could argue
that it should not recognize gain on the sale of the unrelated asset because the
sale of the unrelated asset qualified for nonrecognition treatment under Sec-
tion 337. The Court of Claims primarily held that the reorganization provi-
sions preempted the liquidation rules in such transactions, thus forcing T Corp.
to recognize any gains from sales of assets to third parties during the pendency
of the reorganization." The Fifth Circuit had reached the opposite
conclusion." The new Section 336 makes it clear that the liquidation rules do
not apply to liquidations that are a part of a reorganization plan. 2 Therefore,
any opportunity to sell assets without recognizing gain during the liquidation
phase of a corporate reorganization has disappeared. 3
A. Treatment of Distributions by Continuing Corporations
As noted above, amendments made in 1982 and 1984 had largely wiped
out the General Utilities doctrine as it applied to operating distributions,
"For a good discussion of the use of S corporations to escape the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine by
liquidating before 1989, see Weiss, S Election Can Mitigate Effect of General Utilities Repeal, 65 J. TAX'N
414 (1986).
"See B. BrrrKER & J. EU TICE, supra note 36, 14.32 at 103.
"I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (1985).
"FEC Liquidating Corp. Iv. United States, 548 F.2d 924 (Ct. CL. 1977). Accord Rev. Rul. 70-271, 1970-1
C.B. 166.
"General Housewares, Inc. v. United States, 615 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1980).
"1.R.C. of 1986, §§ 336(c), 361.
"Id. While the new §336(c) merely makes it clear that § 336 does not apply in liquidations that are a part of a
reorganization, the Conference Committee Report makes it clear that the non-recognition rules of the
reorganization rules are to apply. "Neither gain nor loss is recognized, however, with respect to any distribu-
tion of property by a corporation to the extent there is nonrecognition of gain or loss to the recipient under
the tax-free reorganization provisions of the Code (part III of subchapter C)." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-841,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-199-200 (1986).
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distributions in redemption of stock, and distributions in partial liquidation."
The remaining exceptions to gain recognition by nonliquidating corporations
making distributions to their shareholders were repealed by the 1986 Tax
Reform Act, including the following: distributions in partial liquidation to cer-
tain individual shareholders; "qualifying dividends" to certain individual
shareholders; Section 303 redemptions; redemptions by regulated investment
companies; and certain distributions to private foundations in redemption of
stock. " The 1986 Act also repealed the former rule that allowed a parent cor-
poration to distribute, with respect to qualified stock of the parent corporation,
more than fifty percent in value of the stock of a controlled corporation.8 6
B. Relief Provisions
To ameliorate the effects of corporate level gain recognition, the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 contains a few exceptions to the general rule requiring
recognition of gain or loss on corporate distributions in liquidation. The new
liquidation rules continue to treat subsidiary mergers under Section 332 as a
tax-free transaction for the liquidating subsidiary.8 7 To qualify for the special
treatment, the parent corporation must meet the familiar conditions of Section
332 and have at least 80% voting control of the subsidiary, and also hold stock
having a value of at least 80% of the "total value of the stock of such corpora-
tion.""8 Certain non-participating preferred stock does not count as stock for
purposes of the control test.89 If the conditions are met, liquidating distribu-
tions by the subsidiary to the parent corporation,9" including distributions in
exchange for debt owed to the parent corporation, will be tax-free.9' This
favorable treatment for subsidiary mergers is apparently designed to further
the present policy of preventing imposition of the corporate level tax on assets
more than once before they are removed from the corporate solution.92
The favorable treatment for subsidiary mergers, however, will not extend
"Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. 97-248, §223,96 Stat. 483-84(1982); Tax Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. 98-369, § 54, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
11H.R. CON. REP. No. 99-841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-203 (1986).
"I.R.C. § 31 l(d)(2)(B), (e)(2), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 631(c).
'I.R.C. of 1986, § 337.
"I.R.C. of 1986, §§ 332, 337(a), (c).
19 I.R.C. of 1986, §§ 332, § 337(c). Control for this purpose is defined by § 1504(a)(2). The excluded preferred
stock must be non-voting, non-participating preferred stock that is not convertible and that can be redeemed
at no more than issue price plus a reasonable redemption premium. I.R.C. of 1986, § 1504(a)(4).
9I.R.C. of 1986, § 337(b)(1).
I.R.C. of 1986, § 337(a). The nonrecognition rule does not apply if the parent corporation is a tax-exempt
organization, unless the tax-exempt parent will use the distributed property in a taxable unrelated business.
I.R.C. of 1986, § 337(b). The exception for property to be used in an unrelated business has the effect of
postponing the gain or loss recognition until the organization later disposes of the property or ceases to con-
duct the unrelated trade or business. I.R.C. of 1986, § 337(b)(2)(B)(ii).
"Recognition of gain in subsidiary liquidations in which the basis of the distributee's assets are not stepped
up just causes an undesirable "cascading" of gain within groups of corporations. See ALI, Proposals, supra
note 18, at 17.
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to distributions made to the minority shareholders. Distributions to minority
shareholders will be treated under the general rules applicable to distributions
in redemption of stock or liquidations. Therefore, gain will be recognized on
such distributions. 3 Because the new rules apply according to the actual assets
received by the parent corporation and the minority shareholders,94 taxpayers
may be able to minimize gain recognition by using cash, or other property with
relatively little appreciation, to redeem the stock of minority shareholders.
Another important relief provision aimed at the disposition of assets of an
80% controlled subsidiary creates expanded opportunities for avoiding gain
recognition under Section 338(h)(10). An example may help to illustrate the
operation of Section 338(h)(10) before the 1986 amendments. The acquired
corporation, T, was a member of the S controlled group, which files con-
solidated returns. P Corp. acquired 80% control of T in a cash purchase. If P
and S agreed, the transaction could be treated as a sale of the T assets by the S
group to P Corp. The S group would recognize the gain or loss in the T assets
but would avoid recognizing the gain on the sale of the S stock.9" Amendments
made in the 1986 Act to Section 338(h)(10) will extend the application of this
principle to acquisitions similar to those in our example even if the selling af-
filiated group of corporations did not file consolidated returns.96
The final relief provision takes the form of a transitional rule for small
corporations. The repeal of General Utilities generally took effect for distribu-
tions and liquidations after July 31, 1986, unless the liquidation was completed
before January 1, 1987.11 However, for some closely-held corporations with
stock worth less than five million dollars98 only the ordinary gains and losses,
short term capital gains and losses, and gains from the disposition of install-
ment obligations need be recognized if the corporation completely liquidates
before January 1, 1989. 99 To qualify for the special transitional rule, more than
fifty percent of the value of the company's stock must be owned by ten or
fewer "qualified persons."' l Individuals, estates, and certain trusts"0 ' are
93H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-202 (1986).
941d.
951.R.C. § 338(h)(10) (1985). For a more detailed discussion of § 338(h)(10) elections, see Bush & Mullaney,
Section 338(h)(10) Under the New Temporary Regs., 65 J. TAX'N 130 (1986).
6I.R.C. of 1986, § 338(h)(10).I
97Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 633(a).
9 The value of all of the stock of the corporation must be no more than $5 million. The valuation is made at
the date that the plan of complete liquidation is adopted, or on August 1, 1986, if the value of the stock was
greater at that date. Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 633(d)(4).
"Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 633(d).
'Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 633(d)(5)(A).
"'Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 633(d)(6)(A). The trusts permitted are trusts whose incomes were taxed to the
grantors during their lives and testamentary trusts. They only qualify for sixty days after the deaths of the
grantors (grantor trusts) or they receive stock in the company (testamentary trusts). The sixty-day period can
be lengthened for the grantor trusts if the entire value of the trust is included in the gross estate of the grant-
or. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(ii) and (iii) (1985).
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"qualified persons." 2 The Act applies the family attribution rules of Section
318(a)(1) in determining stock ownership, 3 and attributes the stock owned by
entities to their members."' For example, stock owned by a partnership will be
treated as owned pro rata by its partners."5 The benefit of the itransitional rule
phases out for corporations with stock worth between five and ten million
dollars, and no special rule is available for corporations with stock worth more
than ten million dollars.'06
Thus relief from the repeal of General Utilities is very limited. The burden
was removed only for small, closely-held corporations and in situations in
which gain could be cascaded through chains of corporations. Suggestions for
broader relief provisions were rejected, as this article shall discuss below.
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR REPEAL OF GENERAL UTILITIES
A. Assumptions of the Proponents of Reform
Any proponent of tax reform assumes that many of the features of the
current tax law will remain unchanged after the reformed provisions have
been enacted. The proponent of a tax change may believe that a present rule is
desirable and should not be changed, or the proponent may believe that a less
than perfect provision will not be changed for political or administrative
reasons. In any event, the proponents of the repeal of the General Utilities doc-
trine in corporate liquidations usually assumed that the reformed tax structure
would have the following features:
1. Only realized gains would be taxed.0 7
2. The two-level structure of the corporate tax would continue: that is,
corporations taxed upon their own income and their shareholders taxed upon
distributions received from the corporations. Shareholders, however, would
not be taxed on the undistributed earnings of corporations.' 8
"
2Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 633(d)(6)(A).
'°
30ne's family for this purpose includes one's spouse, children, grandchildren and parents. I.R.C. of 1986, §
318(a)(l)(A). Adopted children are treated the same as children by blood. Id. at (a)(l)(B).
"01Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 633(d)(6)(B).
105Id.
"'Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 633(d)(3).
'*'ALI, Proposals, supra note 18, at 11. This assumption appears to be implicit in the Senate Finance Com-
mittee Report and the ABA Task Force Report.
"'REFORM, supra note 14, at 1, 4; ALI, Proposals, supra note 15, at 12-13. The ALl did not adopt recom-
mendations for the revision of the rules governing corporate operating distributions. Instead, the reporter of
the ALI study, Professor Warren of the Harvard Law School, released a reporter's study accompanying the
ALl study that recommended an integration of the corporate level and shareholder level taxes. Id. at 327.
The ABA General Utilities Tax Force Report did not expressly make assumptions, intending to respond to
the Senate Finance Committee proposals. General Utilities Tax Force, Income Taxation of Corporations
Making Distributions With Respect to Their Stock: Task Force Report, 37 TAX LAW. 625, 625-26 (1984).
Generally speaking, the Task Force appears to have implicitly adopted the same assumptions as the Senate
Finance Committee staff.
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3. Capital gains would receive preferential tax treatment. 09
4. Some form of tax-free or tax-deferred treatment would be retained for
some corporate acquisitions."'
5. Successors in interest of a decedent would receive a stepped-up basis in
the property received from the decedent."'
Also, a major assumption of most of the reform proposals was that the
reform of the corporate tax provisions was not intended to be a revenue-raising
provision. Except for potentially broadening the tax base, the reforms were to
be made for policy reasons other than relief of the federal budget deficit."1 2
The assumptions made by the reformers about the shape of the reformed
tax code turned out to be accurate, with the notable exception of the preferen-
tial treatment of capital gains."3 The repeal of preferential treatment for
capital gains, however, only sharpened some of the arguments against the
repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, and capital gains repeal may cause
more changes of taxpayer behavior in corporate transactions than the pro-
ponents of tax reform would have imagined."4 In determining whether the
repeal of General Utilities will achieve what its proponents advocated, it is im-
portant to consider reform provisions that were not enacted as a part of the
revision of Subchapter C, including both larger reforms that Congress did not
add to the law and relief provisions that were not enacted.
B. Reform Proposals for Subchapter C Not Enacted
At least three different business transactions may be accomplished by liq-
uidating a corporation: "(1) the termination of a business; (2) the continuation
of a corporate business by the shareholders of the corporation in unincor-
porated form; or (3) the transfer of a business to a third-party purchaser.""' 5
The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine in corporate liquidations, of
course, affects all three possible transactions. The tax reform proposals of both
the American Law Institute (ALI) and the Senate Finance Committee Staff
focused primarily on complete revision of the rules for corporate acquisitions,
the third of the possible transactions listed above." '6
In both the ALl study and the Senate Finance Committee Staff Report,
the acquiring and selling taxpayers could expressly elect the corporate level tax
' °REFORM, supra note 14, at 4; ALl, Proposals, supra note 15, at 14.
"
0REFORM. supra note 14, at 4; ALl, Proposals, supra note 15, at 6-7.
"'REFORM, supra note 14, at 4.
"'REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 1, at 2-3 (statement of Sen. Dole).
"31.R.C. §§ 1201(b), 1202 (1985), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, §§ 301, 302, 311.
" See infra notes 182-202 and accompanying text.
"'Lyons, Corporate Liquidations and the 'General Utilities Rule," 38 Sw. L.J. 1081, 1084 (1985).
"'ALI, Proposals, supra note 15, at 43 (Proposal AI); REFORM, supra note 14, at 5.
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consequences of a corporate acquisition. By making an election similar to a
Section 338 election, the taxpayers could elect to have a cost basis in the assets
of the acquired company, at the cost of recognizing the gain or loss in those
assets, or to have a carry-over basis accompanied by non-recognition of the
gain or loss inherent in the assets of the acquired company." 7 The elective
treatment of corporate acquisitions prevented an acquiring corporation from
receiving a step-up in basis without recognizing the gains and losses inherent in
the assets of an acquired corporation, but it also offered an acquiring corpora-
tion the opportunity to avoid gain recognition if that were desirable.
The General Utilities rule was to be repealed for liquidations not incident
to an acquisition, but each study considered far-reaching relief provisions for
adversely affected corporate taxpayers. The ALI study suggested that corpor-
ate level gain from goodwill, going concern value, and purchase premium not
allocated to specific assets not be recognized upon a cost-basis acquisition, and
that the distributee receive a zero basis in such assets on liquidation."' The
ALl study also suggested that the shareholders of the liquidating company re-
ceive a credit against their own capital gains taxes for their share of the capital
gains tax paid by the corporation." 9 The Senate Finance Committee Staff Re-
port briefly listed five possible permanent relief alternatives to ameliorate the
harshness of the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine in liquidations. The
firot two alternatives were those considered by the ALI study. The staff also
suggested that the shareholders who received distributions of the corporate as-
sets in kind in a liquidation could elect to defer either the corporate level tax or
the shareholder level tax, or perhaps both, until the shareholders disposed of
the assets. 2 ' In addition, the staff suggested that either the corporate or in-
dividual capital gains rates on such transactions might be reduced. 2' The issue
of relief provisions was important to both proposals, and indeed was the main
focus of the discussion of the repeal of General Utilities in the hearings held by
the Senate Finance Committee to discuss the Staff Report.'
In examining the revision of Subchapter C, the ALI and the Senate Fi-
nance Committee Staff also considered proposals that would have treated pub-
licly traded partnerships as corporations for tax purposes. The ALI considered
this step primarily because of "the administrative and compliance complexity
"'ALI, Proposals, supra note 15, at 43 (Proposal AI); REFORM, supra note 14, at 55.
'ALl, Proposals, supra note 15, at 120-32 (Proposal C2).
"'Id at 134-53 (Proposal C3).
20SUBCHAPTER C REVISION ACT, supra note 8, at 65-66.
12 Id.
"'Senator Dole requested the hearings on the staff report. His press release announcing the hearings asked
witnesses to consider three questions, the first of which was: "If gain is taxed to the corporation on distribu-
tion of appreciated property, is any relief appropriate either on a temporary or permanent basis? If relief is
considered necessary, how should it be structured?" SENATE FINANCE COMM. PRESS RELEASE No. 83-186,
(October 4, 1983), quoted in REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION. supra note 1, at I (statement of Sen. Dole).
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of dealing with large publicly held limited partnerships."'23 The enactment of
the partnership audit and litigation procedures in TEFRA largely mitigated
the concerns of the ALT, and they have not recommended reclassification of
publicly traded partnerships since TEFRA. 24 The staff justified treating pub-
licly traded limited partnerships as corporations to fairly and consistently apply
tax rules to all large business entities.'25 Congress did not enact a reclas-
sification provision in 1986. Because of the repeal of General Utilities and the
consequent increase in the tax burden on corporation liquidations, more
business ventures may be conducted in the partnership form in the future,
leading to a possible reconsideration of this issue by Congress in the future.'
12 6
C. Arguments for Reform - In Retrospect
Perhaps the most important argument made in favor of the repeal of the
General Utilities doctrine was that the doctrine permitted the step up in basis
of corporate property with only a shareholder level capital gains tax that did
not bear any necessary relationship to the corporate level tax foregone.'27 Ac-
cordingly, General Utilities disrupted the system of double taxation of cor-
porate income.'28 However, so long as the recipient of property from a corpora-
tion in liquidation receives a carry-over basis in the property received from the
corporation, double taxation is not threatened.'29 As Lewis put it in his seminal
paper on the repeal of General Utilities: "The provisions hardly pay lip service
to the "double tax" system. Congress has sawed off the tailgate of the cor-
porate tax wagon. In doing so, it has weighted the tax system in favor of
business liquidators and traders and against continuing owners.","
Because the basis of stock did not necessarily bear any relationship to the
basis of the assets within the corporation, the tax imposed on the shareholder
at liquidation bore no relationship to the corporate level tax burden avoided.'
If the corporation liquidated and distributed its assets to the estate or ben-
eficiaries of a deceased taxpayer, for example, the step-up in basis would wipe
out any tax liability for any party to the transaction.'
"'Hobbet, Limited Partnerships: Associations or Partnerships?, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 107 (1985).
2 REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 1, at 356-60 (statement of George S. Slocum).
2
'REFORM, supra note 14, at 50-51 n.6.
2 See infra notes 138-142 and accompanying text.
'E.g., Blum, Taxing Transfers of Incorporated Businesses: A Proposal for Improvement. 52 TAXES 516,
523 (1974).
'
2 Shube, supra note 2, at 51-53.
"'Lyons, supra note 115, at 1106-12.
"'Lewis, A Proposed New Treatment for Corporate Distributions and Sales in Liquidation, in 3 TAX REVI-
SION COMPENDIUM SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITrEE 1643, 1644-45 (Comm. Print
1959).
"'Shube, supra note 2, at 51.
"'Blum, Behind the General Utilities Doctrine, Or Why Does the General Have So Much Support From the
Troops?, 62 TAXES 292, 294 (1984).
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The opportunity to escape the double tax burden also led taxpayers to
shape their transactions to take advantage of the avoidance of the double tax.
First, as already noted, General Utilities created incentives for taxpayers to liq-
uidate businesses which might otherwise have continued to operate in the cor-
porate form.'33 Some have even argued that the doctrine has increased acquisi-
tion and merger activity.'34 While the Treasury Department has expressed
doubt that the doctrine caused acquisition activity,'35 it is certainly true that
corporate level nonrecognition of gain provides an incentive rather than a
disincentive for taxable acquisitions.'36 Second, the General Utilities rule also
encouraged corporations to liquidate and later reincorporate to receive an in-
crease in the basis of their assets at low tax cost. Liquidation followed by rein-
corporation also provided opportunities for other forms of tax avoidance.
Because the first corporation had disappeared, its tax attributes, such as earn-
ings and profits, also disappeared after the liquidation. These attributes did not
carry over to the new corporation.'37
In response to the imposition of a double tax on corporate liquidations,
commentators opposed to the repeal of General Utilities argued either that the
system of double taxation did not apply to transactions other than the ordinary
operation of the corporation,' or that corporate level nonrecognition should
be retained as a beginning of integration of the corporate and individual
taxes."'
Integration of the corporate and individual income taxes is certainly a
desirable goal. Even the Treasury in previous administrations has proposed it
as a goal of tax reform. 4 Because corporations are not consumers in the same
sense as individuals are, "all corporate income ultimately can be accounted for
either as consumption by individuals or as an increase in the value of claims of
individuals who own corporate shares."'' Therefore, the corporate income tax
'ALI, Proposals, supra note 15, at 112.
'
3 Yin, General Utilities Repealt Is Tax Reform Really Going to Pass it By? 31 TAX NOTES 1111, 1115-16
(1986).
"I-Hearing before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Finance Committee
on Hostile Takeovers, 99th Cong., Ist Sess 119, 127 (1985) (statement of Ronald Pearlman, Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of Treasury).
11
6 Yin, supra note 134, at 1115-16; see also Allen, A Leveraged Buyout Checklist After Tax Reform, 33 TAX
NOTES 1151, 1153 (1986). One cannot, however, underestimate the incentive effects of the deductibility of
interest in encouraging use of the leveraged buy-out. Canellos, The Over-Leveraged Acquisition, 39 TAX
LAW. 91 (1985).
37B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE. supra note 36, 11.05 at 11-18. For a thorough discussion of the liquidation-
reincorporation transaction and several proposals to eradicate all of its effects, see Nunnallee, The
"Liquidation-Reincorporation" Doctrine Revisited After the Tax Reform Act of 1984: Do Sections 302 and
304 Provide the Solution? 40 TAX LAW. 1 (1986).
"I Nolan, Taxing Corporate Distributions of Appreciated Property: Repeal of the General Utilities Doctrine
and Relief Measures, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 97, 100 (1985).
'
39Gould, General Utilities Repeal: Tax Reform Should Pass It By. 32 TAX NOTES 147, 148 (1986).
"'DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 4-5 (1977).
1
41Id. at 4.
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imposes an indirect tax on individuals, but it is unclear whether the tax is paid
by corporate customers or shareholders.' Integration would also eliminate
distortions favoring investment in noncorporate rather than corporate entities,
accumulation of income within corporations, and the preference for debt
rather than equity financing.'43
However, arguments about whether we have a two-level tax with excep-
tions or a one-level tax with exceptions remind one of trying to decide whether
a glass of water is half full or half empty. At least with a complete system of
some sort, one may decide whether or not it is desirable and either avoid or em-
brace it. If integration is a desirable goal of tax policy, it should be pursued as a
systematic policy choice rather than by complex exception. "' Furthermore,
adoption of the policy goal of corporate and individual income tax integration
also requires systematic study and choice from among the several possible
models for integration.' 5
The second major reason for repealing General Utilities is
simplification.'46 According to critics of the doctrine, retaining the General
Utilities rule introduced complexity into the lives of both those administering
the tax law and the taxpayers and their advisers trying to take advantage of the
benefits of General Utilities.'47 Retaining the doctrine but attempting to deal
with its adverse side effects led to various remedial rules from Congress, the
courts, and the Treasury Department. To appreciate the complexities of a liq-
uidation before the repeal of the doctrine, one need only consider the excep-
tions to the general rule of nonrecognition for a liquidating corporation. The
following gains or recapture could be recognized by the corporation in a "tax-
free" liquidation: (1) the difference between FIFO value and LIFO value for
LIFO valued inventories;' (2) the gain inherent in installment obligations;'49
(3) recapture items;'50 (4) items involving an assignment of income; ' and (5)
142 d.
"'4ALI, Proposals, supra note 15, at 352.
'"Wolfman, Corporate Distributions of Appreciated Property: The Case for Repeal of the General Utilities
Doctrine, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 81, 85 (1985).
" See McClure, Must Corporate Income Be Taxed Twice? in READINGS IN FEDERAL TAXATION 576, 592-95
(2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter READINGS IN FEDERAL TAXATION].
"6E.g., Lewis, A Proposed New Treatment for Corporate Distributions and Sales in Liquidation, in 3 TAX
REVISION COMPENDIUM SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE 1643, 1644 (Comm. Print
1959) (calls the statute "almost unbelievably complex").
147Id.
1
4
.R.C. §§ 336(b), 337(f) (1985). If a corporation liquidated under § 337 and failed to make a bulk sale of its
inventory, the company could recognize all of the gain inherent in its stock in trade. I.R.C. § 337(b) (1985).
1'1.R.C. § 453B(a) (1985).
"50i.R.C. §§ 47, 291, 617(d), 1245, 1250, 1252, 1254, 1255 (1985).
"'Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d 524, 529-30 (Ct. Cl. 1961). Sometimes, while the assignment of in-
come doctrine did not apply at the time of liquidation, income items might ripen sufficient during the
winding-up to become taxable. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 36, 11.62, at 47-52.
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tax benefit items. 5' In addition, the Service could assert that the accounting
methods of a liquidating corporation did not clearly "reflect income," even
though the accounting method was proper for the corporation before it liq-
uidated.'53 One would hope that more law would produce more clarity, but the
sweep of rules such as assignment of income rules, the tax benefit rules, and
the rules of proper accounting was uncertain, leaving the law both complex
and confusing.'54
Perhaps the most complex side effect of corporate level nonrecognition in
corporate liquidations was the collapsible corporation provision.'55 Among the
first collapsible corporations were companies organized to produce one motion
picture. Before realizing the income from the venture, the shareholders avoid-
ed the corporate level tax by liquidating the corporation or selling it to another
taxpayer and realizing capital gains.'56 Congress first attacked the collapsible
corporation in 1950 by imposing ordinary income on shareholders of the col-
lapsible corporation who sold their stock or caused the corporation to liquidate
without realizing the ordinary gain inherent in the corporation.'57 In its various
attempts to refine the collapsible corporation section of the Code so as to plug
its gaps and limit its scope to truly abusive situations, Congress began with a
bad idea and has ended up with a nightmare. 5 Most commentators believed
that the repeal of General Utilities would allow the repeal of Section 341."'
The elimination of both of its "parents," General Utilities and preferential
capital gains treatment, certainly eliminates the need for Section 341.60
In addition, taking advantage of nonrecognition required careful planning
to avoid the remedial rules and to conform to the requirements of sections like
337, the twelve-month liquidation rule. 6' Before 1986, Section 337 permitted a
corporation to sell off assets without recognizing gain or loss on the sales if the
corporation adopted a plan of liquidation before selling the assets and liq-
"'Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
11B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 36, 11.62 at 59-60.
"'Shube, supra note 2, at 45.
"'I.R.C. § 341 (1985). For good discussions of the rules governing collapsible corporations, see Ginsburg,
supra note 41; and Holden, supra note 41. Ginsburg, ever gentle, calls § 341 "equally incomprehensible to
practitioners, revenue agents, and . .. judges." Ginsburg, supra note 41, at 313.
11B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 36, 112.01 at 1-3. A more complete discussion of the roots of the pro-
vision, including titles of films produced by collapsible corporations, may be found in Shube, supra note 2, at
42-43 & n. 180.
'"I.R.C. of 1939, § 117(m) (1950).
"'Ginsburg, supra note 41, at 310-12.
"'E.g., Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE
L.J. 90, 152 (1977); Reform of Corporate Taxation: Hearing before the Senate Finance Committee, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1983) (statement of Ronald Pearlman, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department
of Treasury). Interestingly enough, none of the major proposals for repeal of the General Utilities doctrine
actually call for the repeal of § 341. Perhaps the commentators should have said that Congress might repeal
§ 341. Hawkins, A Discussion of the Repeal of General Utilities, 37 TAx LAW. 641, 646 (1984).
'10Ginsburg, supra note 41, at 325-28.
.6I.R.C. § 337 (1985), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 633(d)(3).
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uidated within twelve months after the plan was adopted.'62 Taxpayers were
often able to multiply their tax advantages under Section 337 by a tax straddle,
recognizing their losses before the adoption of a liquidation plan, the event
that began the twelve-month period of nonrecognition for sales of corporate
assets. After adoption of the plan of liquidation, the taxpayers then sold their
appreciated property without recognizing gain. 63 The tax avoidance
possibilities to manipulate Section 337 led to the belief in the government that
the provision was just too favorable and caused litigation over the technical re-
quirements of Section 337. The ensuing litigation produced complexity
without producing certainty.'64
The existence of the General Utilities doctrine also made necessary the
consistency rules of Section 338.165 Before the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Sec-
tion 338 permitted an acquiring corporation that purchases 80% of the stock
of a target company to elect a step-up in basis to the fair market value of the
target company's assets at the cost of recognizing the income, such as deprecia-
tion recapture, that would be recognized if the target corporation had sold its
assets under old Section 337.166 Requiring recognition of the recapture items in
the target company's assets imposed a price on the step-up in basis under Sec-
tion 338 and limited the tax advantages of the General Utilities principle in
Section 338 transactions. The consistency rules were an attempt to make sure
that a fair price was paid for the step-up in basis. Consistency prevented an ac-
quiring company from selecting some of the assets of a purchased corporation
for stepped-up basis treatment without recognizing the recapture income in-
herent in all of the assets of the acquired company.' 67 These complex and in-
tricate rules placed a premium on the skill of the tax adviser, created traps for
the unwary taxpayer, and had the effect of maintaining a tax system that
discriminated, more severely than usual, against the ill-advised. 16 8
In summary, removing significant complexities in the law of corporate liq-
uidations and simplifying the variety of transactions for taxpayers were the
second important reasons for the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
The third major reason for the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine was
to broaden the tax base. 169 The opportunity for a tax-free step-up in basis in cor-
"I I.R.C. § 337(a) (1985) repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 633(d)(3). Corporate level non-recognition
under § 337, however, was subject to the same exceptions, recapture items for example, on nonrecognition
that haunted distribution of assets in liquidation.
161B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 36, 11.64 at 71-74.
'L4Shube, supra note 2, at 48.
6
'Ginsburg, supra note 46, at 317-19.
161.R.C. § 338(a) (1985) amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 632.
6 1.R.C. §§ 338(d)-(e).
'6'See REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 1, at 19 (statement of Ronald Pearlman, Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of Treasury). Id. at 87-88 (statement of Edward Delaney, chair-
man of the ABA Section on Taxation).
91d. at 19 (statement of Ronald Pearlman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of
Treasury).
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porate liquidations was one of the tax expenditures listed in the periodic
reports of the Joint Committee on Taxation. The doctrine's repeal, without a
decrease in tax rates, was estimated to produce approximately $26 billion over
a five year period, 1987-1991.17° More taxable income from corporate liquida-
tions should occur even if taxpayers change their behavior and avoid taxable
acquisitions. Economists estimate that the reduced depreciation deductions
from acquisitions with a carry-over basis will cause an increase in projected
revenue three or four years after the repeal of the doctrine.17' On the other
hand, at least one commentator believes that less base broadening will occur
because taxpayers will change their behavior in order to take advantage of the
new rules. The ability to elect either gain recognition and a carryover basis or
gain recognition and a step-up in basis, available to corporations acquiring
other corporations under Sections 332 and 338, may tend to mitigate the base
broadening effect. As one commentator noted, "My instincts tell me that the
revenue loss each year from recapture, and other taxes that would be collected
under present law but will not be collected with the repeal of General Utilities
coupled with an 'escape hatch,' [the ability to take a carry-over basis in ac-
quired assets without recognition of gain] will outweigh any revenue gained
from ... future depreciation and other deductions."''
Several other arguments supported the reform of the General Utilities
doctrine, but these were generally either subsumed in the arguments sum-
marized above or were less important. For example, arguments based on dif-
ferent treatment for comparable transactions were generally examples that
were based on the step-up in basis without corresponding recognition of gain.173
The other argument presented by proponents that has some independent force
is that the parties to corporate acquisitions and liquidations could allocate the
step-up in basis without regard to the fair market value of the assets in liquida-
tion transactions. In a normal sale of property between unrelated parties, the
parties have opposing interests that cause them to negotiate prices that reflect
fair value. Under the General Utilities rule, if the shareholders of the target
company sold their stock to an acquiring corporation that would elect to step-
up the basis of the target company's assets, the selling shareholders had no in-
centive to bargain with the acquiring company about the value of the target's
assets. This lack of incentive could lead the acquiring company to allocate the
price paid for the target's assets in a manner advantageous to the acquiring
" JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG.. 2D SESS., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAl. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR
FISCAL YEARS 1987-1991 (1986), quoted in Yin, supra note 134, at 1116. The estimated effect on the budget
for the same period included in the Conference Committee Report on the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
however, was much smaller, only $1.697 billion, and this effect would be partially reduced by reductions in
individual taxes in such transactions of $143 million. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986) (Table A.2.).
"'Yin, supra note 134, at 1117.
'Thompson, An Analysis of the Proposal to Repeal General Utilities with an 'Escape Hatch,' 31 TAX
NOTES 1121, 1124 (1986).
"'See, e.g., ALl, Proposals, supra note 15, at 114.
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company, rather than according to fair values.'74 Of course, the argument that
the repeal of General Utilities would cause a more accurate allocation of basis
to the assets of a liquidated company has little validity in situations in which
the corporation is merely distributing its assets to be operated in a noncor-
porate form by its former shareholders. The shareholders will just make an
allocation that produces the most favorable tax result, comparing the present
tax burden to the present value of the depreciation deductions of various
allocations. Even in corporate acquisitions, there may be no necessity for a
seller of corporate stock and a purchaser making a Section 338 election to
agree upon the allocation of the price without some statutory requirement that
they do so' or unless the government specifies how the price shall be
allocated by both parties.'76
IV. EVALUATION OF THE REPEAL OF THE GENERAL UTILITIES DOCTRINE
For the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine to be a beneficial tax
reform, it must alleviate the problems identified by the proponents of reform,
and it must not cause severe disadvantages. In evaluating the repeal of General
Utilities, the reviewer must consider the other provisions of the reform legisla-
tion that influence how the repeal of General Utilities affects taxpayers. In this
case, the major features of the Tax Reform Act that must be considered in-
clude (1) the repeal of special treatment of capital gains, (2) the relief provisions
enacted with the repeal of General Utilities, (3) the failure to repeal un-
necessary provisions, and (4) the failure to enact complementary tax reforms,
particularly simplification of the tax-free acquisition rules and provisions deal-
ing with publicly-traded limited partnerships.
The most significant disadvantage of the repeal of the General Utilities
rule identified by most opponents of reform is the increased tax cost of cor-
porate liquidations, particularly in the cost of changing small businesses with
long-held capital assets from the corporate form to an unincorporated form.'77
The repeal of preferential capital gains treatment coupled with the repeal of
General Utilities made this disadvantage more acute, and the reforms will
cause more taxpayers to seek relief in portions of the tax law that are even
more complicated and filled with pitfalls than the former body of corporate liq-
uidation law.
The most important arguments for repealing corporate level nonrecogni-
tion in corporate liquidations all stemmed from the ability to gain a step-up in
basis of corporate assets on liquidation without recognizing the inherent gain
"Id. at 112-13.
"'Thompson, supra note 173, at 1125.
"
6Congress has specified that taxpayers make such allocations in acquisitions governed by § 338, I.R.C. of
1986, § 338(b)(5), and in other asset acquisitions, I.R.C. of 1986, § 1060(a).
" REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, suprd note 1, at 153-54 (statement of John S. Nolan).
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in these assets.7 1 Most commentators recognized that the real abuse was allow-
ing a step-up in the basis of stock in trade and other ordinary income assets
without a corresponding corporate level tax.'79 Much of the gain inherent in
other business assets was recognized under old Sections 336 and 337 through
the recapture sections.8 ' Most commentators, however, acknowledged that a
severe tax burden on long-held capital assets was not desirable, 8, and the com-
bination of the repeal of General Utilities with the repeal of advantageous cap-
ital gains treatment only aggravated the ill effects predicted by most commen-
tators.
The repeal of the preferential treatment for capital gains in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 and the failure to enact meaningful relief provisions for
the gain in long-held capital assets produce a real hardship on current small
businesses. The theoretical reasons for granting special relief from corporate
level gain recognition for long-held capital assets resemble the justifications of-
fered for long term capital gains.'82 Much of the gain in these assets is usually
due to the general increase in price levels and was accrued over a number of
years. Unless the requirement that no gain be taxed before realization is re-
pealed, the bunching of such income and its taxation at one time are harsh,
particularly when very often the gain is reflected in the capital gain recognized
by the shareholder upon sale or liquidation of the shareholder's stock."3 Con-
gress saw fit to repeal the special treatment of capital gains in 1986 primarily
because of the low overall rates being applied to taxable income."' This
justification makes much less sense when the lower overall rates are being ap-
plied to both the corporation and the shareholder in the same transaction.
The burden of capital gains taxes will be particularly great for smaller
businesses for several reasons."5 First, large corporations usually do not liq-
uidate, and in acquisitions they can avoid the burden of taxation by using loss
carry-overs to offset gains, using the reorganization provisions to avoid gain
179Id.
"'E.g., ALl, Proposals, supra note 15, at 113-14.
1901d.
,sGeneral Utilities Tax Force, supra note 108, at 625.
"'See Brinner & Munnell, Taxation of Capital Gains: Inflation and Other Problems, in READINGS IN
FEDERAL TAXATION. supra note 145, at 403-06.
"'Nolan, supra note 138, at 98-99. This argument does not seem theoretically compelling, but the harshness
of the repeal of General Utilities without relief for such assets was a widely perceived need among commen-
tators. REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 1, at 142 (statement of Robert A. Jacobs).
"IS. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 169 (1986).
" 'It is possible to overstate the case favoring small business. While the repeal of the General Utilities doc-
trine may cause real hardship to many small businesses, some of the "small" corporations are wealthy
enough to pay the tax. "Although the idea of asset distributions by Mom and Pop corporations that are free
of one level of tax evokes sympathy, one observer noted that the reality is closer to the Carringtons of the
prime time television drama 'Dynasty.' 'What you really have out there is 'Dynasty' waiting to use the
General Utilities rule,' Prof. James S. Eustice of New York University commented at the September 30,
1985 Senate Finance Committee hearing on subchapter C reform." Sheppard, General Utilities Repeal and
"Dynasty, 'TAX NOTES (January 13, 1986).
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recognition, and electing carry-over basis treatment under Section 338 to avoid
gain recognition.'86 Second, small and family-owned corporations are likely to
hold the investment assets of the owners or their families, leading to additional
capital gains. Third, because the small corporations are the only ones that can
realistically take advantage of tax-free incorporation under Section 351, small
corporations are those mostly likely to be burdened by tax on preincorporation
appreciation in corporate assets. 7 Fourth, personal or family concerns may
cause dissolution of the corporation, while larger corporations do not face such
problems. 8 Fifth, because small business owners are often employed by their
businesses, this increased tax burden and decrease in the after-tax proceeds
from the sale of their businesses may be particularly burdensome because it
will coincide with a termination of income from employment.' 89 Finally, long-
standing tax policy had encouraged shareholders to contribute long-term
capital assets in forming their small corporations. Therefore, all of the prob-
lems caused by tax reform for small corporations holding long-held capital
assets become more difficult because the taxpayers have relied on the existence
of the General Utilities doctrine in devising their corporate plans. 9
In spite of the widespread attention to the need for relief from double tax-
ation for the long-held capital assets of closely-held corporations, Congress
granted no specific relief for such assets, other than a transitional rule permit-
ting small, closely-held corporations to use the old rules for two more years. 9'
The Senate Finance Committee staff, in their 1985 draft revision of Sub-
chapter C, suggested several alternative forms of relief, primarily aimed at the
small corporation. The staff suggested that the shareholders of S corporations
receive a basis increase in their stock which reflect the corporate level tax on
long-held capital assets.'92 Under the staff's proposal, liquidations in kind were
exempted from the corporate level tax, and the shareholders would take a
carry-over basis in the distributed assets. 93 Also, acquiring corporations could
elect to defer the tax on the intangible assets of target companies by taking a
carry-over basis in the intangibles. 94 In addition, the staff also recommended
" 
6REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 1, at 155 (statement of John S. Nolan).
"' Beck, Distributions in Kind in Corporate Liquidations: A Defense of General Utilities, 38 TAX LAW. 663,
675 (1985).
"'REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION. supra note 1, at 153-54 (statement of John S. Nolan).
"Beck, supra note 187, at 675.
'"'REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 1, at 175-76 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen). Ordinarily, an
argument based on reliance upon the law not changing is a weak one that would prevent all changes in law.
In this case, particularly in connection with the reliance on I.R.C. § 35 1, it seems to make more sense. "Thus
those who have relied on the existing structure in planning their affairs would be subject to a greater tax
burden on disposition than previously thought. While every change in the tax laws has this effect to a
greater or lesser extent, in light of the broad impact of this project, the Committee might want to consider
whether a deferred effective date or other transitional relief should be provided." Id. at 23 (statement of
Ronald Pearlman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of Treasury).
'"II.R.C. of 1986, § 337(d).
"'
925UBCHAPTER C REVISION ACT, supra note 8, at 65.
'
11d. at 66-67.
194Id.
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relief for small S corporations and transitional relief."' Presumably for revenue
reasons, the relief granted in the actual bill was significantly less then than
originally proposed by the Senate Finance Committee staff.'96
Some smaller corporations may have additional relief available if they
elected S corporation status. S corporation status, however, will be difficult to
use to ameliorate all of the consequences of the repeal of General Utilities. Not
all small corporations meet the requirements for electing S corporation
status.'97 Some have disqualifying shareholders, such as corporations or part-
nerships, or too many shareholders.'98 Frequently for family or other reasons,
small corporations have more than one class of stock, or have shareholder
trusts that do not fit within the few types of trusts permitted as S corporation
shareholders.'99 Even if the corporation qualifies to elect S corporation status,
one unwilling shareholder may hold up the others."' Finally, being an S cor-
poration does not necessarily prevent gain from recognition at the corporate
level on liquidation. Under new Section 1374, any liquidation of the corpora-
tion within ten years after it elects S corporation status will cause the recogni-
tion of all of the "built-in gain" in its assets.20' The S corporation may prove
that it should not recognize gain if the S corporation acquired the asset after
the corporation elected S status, or that the gain in the asset is greater than the
gain in the asset at the time of election of S status."2 For tangible property,
these exceptions may work reasonably well, but one becomes concerned about
their application to intangible assets. When does an intangible asset arise? One
could probably assume that an established corporation has assets like goodwill,
customer lists, trade secrets, trade processes, and know how when the S elec-
tion is made, but such assets are notoriously difficult to value. How can the
taxpayer expect to establish the fair market value of an intangible asset as of
"Id. at 67-68.
'Sheppard, supra note 185.
"One commentator has noted that "we must temper our enthusiasm for Subchapter S by being cognizant
that it is an alternative which is suitable for only a few businesses." Shaw, Impact of Proposals on Acquisi-
tions of Closely Held Corporations, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 289, 302 (1985).
'See 1.R.C. § 136 1(b) (1986).
" I.R.C. § 1361 (b)( 1) (1986); REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, Hearing, supra note I, at 176-77 (statement
of Edwin S. Cohen). The only trusts that qualify as shareholders in S corporations are trusts that are treated
as owned by an individual resident of the United States or, for sixty days after the individual's death, trusts
that were treated as owned by an individual during the individual's life. (This period may be extended to two
years if the trust corpus is includible in the individual's gross estate.) Id. at (c)(2)(A)(i), (ii). Also qualifying as
shareholders of S corporations are testamentary trusts, for the first sixty days after they receive S corpora-
tion stock, voting trusts, and "qualified Subchapter S trusts." Id. at (c)(2)(A)(iii), (iv), (d). A "qualified Sub-
chapter S trust" (1) may have only one income beneficiary, an individual, at a time; (2) the interest of an in-
come beneficiary may only end at the beneficiary's death or the termination of the trust; (3) any corpus
distributions during the life of an income beneficiary must be made to that income beneficiary; and (4) at ter-
mination, the corpus of the trust must be distributed to current income beneficiary of the trust. Id. at (d)(3).
In addition, the income beneficiary of a "qualified Subchapter S trust" must elect to have the trust so treated
for each S corporation in which it holds stock. Id. at (d)(2).
"'I.R.C. § 1362(a)(2) (1986).
"'I.R.C. of 1986, § 1374.
'1.R.C. of 1986, § 1374(d)(2).
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the beginning of the taxable year of its S election to the satisfaction of an
auditor from the Service? It will be interesting to see.
One of the most important arguments for the repeal of the General Utili-
ties rule was that repeal would remove complexities from the tax law and the
lives of taxpayers."3 On this count, reform has only partially succeeded. The
statutory amendments do make the Code provisions simpler, and they do re-
move the choices and qualifications associated with the now vanished one-
month (Section 333) and twelve-month (Section 337) liquidations. On the other
hand, the infamous collapsible corporation provision was not repealed, despite
the removal of both the preferential treatment of capital gains and the repeal
of the General Utilties doctrine, the rules that allegedly caused Section 341 to
be written.' 4 In the eyes of some commentators, the repeal of Section 341 was
the principal simplification that could come from the repeal of General Utili-
ties.205 While Section 341 would have little impact in most cases, and may van-
ish from lack of enforcement, it could still cause trouble to the unwary share-
holder. If a shareholder of a collapsible corporation has substantial capital loss
carry-overs, the unexpected conversion of capital gain into ordinary income on
the sale of the shareholder's stock could cause consternation for the taxpayer
because of Section 341, even though the benefits of capital gains have been
repealed.2°0 If simplification is to be achieved, Congress must have the courage
to remove the superseded provisions or render them ineffective.
In addition, tax reform will bring its own complexities in interpretation of
its new rules. One need only consider the proof burdens placed on the officers
and shareholders of S corporations under new Section 1374 to show that assets
were acquired before the corporation elected S status, and their values at the
time that the S election was made, to realize that the lives of taxpayers will not
be universally simpler under tax reform." 7 Applying the new anti-stuffing rules
will also not be simple for taxpayers or tax administrators. 8 Persons taking
property from a liquidating corporation may receive a carry-over basis in the
acquired property if the property was contributed to the liquidating corpora-
tion and the liquidation "was part of a plan the principal purpose of which was
to recognize loss by the liquidating corporation" on such property." 9 As Bittker
and Eustice have written of Section 269, another "principal purpose" section,
"like most statutory provisions turning on the taxpayer's motive or intent, con-
siderable difficulty in application is to be expected."' ' Even though Congress
"'See Beck, supra note 187 at 678.
2
"Ginsburg, supra note 41, at 325.
120Beck, supra note 187, at 678-79.
2
-I.R.C. of 1986, § 341(a).
1'See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
2081.R.C. of 1986, § 336(d).
-I.R.C. of 1986, § 336(d)(2)(B)(i)(1I).
210B. BIrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 36, 16.21 at 45. For a more complete discussion of determination of
principal purpose in tax statutes, see Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purpose in Federal Income Taxation, 34 U.
CHI. L. REv. 485, 506-13 (1967).
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seems to intend that this provision seldom be used, and even though Congress
has attempted to require a clear showing of intent,"' this provision will likely
result in uncertainty for all parties concerned, and ensuing complexity and
litigation. Beyond the complexities of language, further complexity may result
from taxpayer behavior to avoid the burdens of the new legislation.
A. Incomplete Tax Reform and Taxpayer Response
1. Mergers and Acquisitions
In both the ALI study and the Senate Finance Committee staff proposal,
the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine was to be part of a more generalized
revision of the acquisition provisions of Subchapter C.212 In both proposals,
despite the consideration used to carry out the acquisitions, the corporation
could elect to take a carry-over basis without any corporate level gain recogni-
tion or could elect to take a stepped-up basis by recognizing the gain inherent
in the assets of the acquired corporation. Among the justifications for reform
of corporate acquisitions was the belief that the definitional provisions for tax-
free reorganizations were complex beyond any justification, inconsistent, and
confusing. The proponents of reform believed that making the tax conse-
quences of a corporate acquisition depend on an express election was more
reasonable than allowing taxpayers to elect their tax consequences by shaping
the form of their acquisition. Requiring taxpayers to shape their transactions
correctly to avoid adverse tax consequences penalized the ill-financed and the
ill-advised." 3 The reform of the reorganization provision was not implemented,
probably because there was little perceived abuse of the current provisions",
and because such a drastic change might have unexpected consequences.
The reorganization provisions are not directly related to the repeal of
General Utilities, but there will be more opportunities for the current complex-
ities to inconvenience taxpayers after reform. Because the cost of taxable ac-
quisitions has gone up, most commentators expect that taxpayers will switch
from taxable acquisitions to nontaxable ones."5 It is also reasonable to expect
that taxpayers may want to divide up their corporate assets in order to make
later sale more convenient. To accomplish this feat, taxpayers may also make
use of another "troubled"2"' portion of subchapter C, the divisive "D"
2
"See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
2
'ALI, Proposals, supra note 15, at 6-9; SUBCHAPrER C REVISION AcT, supra note 8, at 50-58. For a critique
of the Senate Finance Committee proposals and for a counterproposal that would simplify the definition of a
nontaxable reorganization but that would not rely on the elective step-up in basis, see Thompson, A Sug-
gested Alternative Approach to the Senate Finance Committee Staffs 1985 Proposals for Revising the
Merger and Acquisition Provisions, 5 VA. TAX. REV. 599 (1986).
"'Leduc, supra note 16 at 54-59.
"'
4REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note I, at 18 (statement of Ronald Pearlman, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of Treasury).
2
'Salem, Corporate Tax Reform: Changes Affecting Acquisitions and the Form of Organization, N.Y.U.
TAX INST. SEMINAR ON TAX REFORM AcT OF 1986 4-10 (1986).
16B. BrITKER & J. EUsTlCE, supra note 36, 113.01 at 1.
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reorganization.217 It is ironic that in reducing complexity and confusion in one
part of subchapter C, Congress has encouraged taxpayers to use provisions
that may be even more confusing and complex.
Another of the simplifications suggested by some proponents of the repeal
of the General Utilities doctrine was the repeal of the consistency rules of Sec-
tion 338.218 An example illustrating the consistency rules may help to explain
their operation. P Corp. is the parent corporation and owns 100% of Sub I
Corp. and 100% of Sub 2 Corp. (For the sake of simplicity, Sub 1 Corp. and
Sub 2 Corp. each have only one class of voting common stock.) P Corp. and its
two subsidiaries, Sub 1 and Sub 2, are an affiliated group of corporations, be-
cause P owns more than 80% of the voting power of Sub 1 and Sub 2 and
more than 80% of the value of all of the stock of Sub 1 and Sub 2.219 A Corp.
purchases at least 80% control of Sub I and Sub 2 from P Corp.120 A Corp.
wants the assets of Sub I to have a stepped-up basis. For the assets of Sub 1 to
have a stepped-up basis, A Corp. must make a Section 338 election, which re-
quired that Sub 1 recognize the recapture inherent in its assets. 2 1 The consis-
tency rules required that A Corp. could not elect to step-up the basis of the as-
sets of Sub I without also stepping up the basis of the assets of Sub 2.222 Consis-
tency rules also require that if A Corp. attempted to step up even one asset
from either Sub 1 or Sub 2 by purchasing the asset during the one year before
beginning the acquisition of the subs, the year allowed for the acquisition of
the stock of the subs, or the year after the "acquisition period," A Corp. would
be treated as making a Section 338 election for all of the assets of the Sub from
171.R.C. of 1986, §§ 368(a)(l)(D), 355. §§ 368(a)(l)(D) and 355 permit a corporation to spin-off an active
business that the corporation has operated for five years to a new corporation, Newco, and distribute the
Newco stock to the shareholders of the original corporation. The original corporation must also retain an ac-
tive business that it has operated for five years or the stock of a subsidiary that operates such a business.
I.R.C. of 1986, § 355(b). If the original corporation wants to retain the stock in Newco, the original corpora-
tion can rely on the provisions of I.R.C. of 1986, § 351 to permit it to drop assets into Newco without
recognition of gain.
2 
'TAX TREATMENT OF CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON
FINANCE, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1982) (testimony of David G. Glickman, Treasury Department) cited in
Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 46, 12.06 at 12-65 n. 167; Ginsburg, supra note 46, at 317-19.
219I.R.C. § 1504(a)(2) (1985). The stock to be valued does not include non-participating preferred stock that
has no voting rights and is not convertible into other stock. The redemption value of the stock must not be
greater than the paid-in value of the stock plus a reasonable redemption premium. Id. at (a)(4).
2 A Corp. must acquire 80% of the voting power of each of the subs and must acquire 80% of the total
value of the stock of the subs, other than non-voting, non-convertible, non-participating preferred stock.
I.R.C. § 338(d)(1), (3) (1985). A Corp. must also acquire the stock by purchase. The term "purchase" is de-
fined by exclusion as an acquisition which does not qualify for non-recognition treatment under § 351 (incor-
poration) or in an tax-free reorganization, is not determined by reference to the basis of stock in the hands of
some other taxpayer, or is not acquired from a related party under § 318. Stock received from a decedent
with a basis determined under § 1014 also does not qualify as purchased stock. I.R.C. § 338(h)(3) (1985).21.R.C. § 338(a) (1985). The mechanism for this recognition of recapture items was an imaginary sale of the
assets within Sub I under § 337. Section 337 generally caused the recognition of the difference between the
LIFO and FIFO value of the inventory, recaptures of depreciation under §§ 1245 and 1250, recapture of in-
vestment tax credit under § 47, and recapture of tax benefit items, among other things. Under § 338(a), the
election serves to meet the requirements of § 337, without the adoption of a liquidation plan or a liquidation.
22I.R.C. § 338(" (1985).
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which A Corp. purchased the asset.223 Finally, Congress gave authority to the
Treasury Department to draft additional regulations to protect avoidance of
the consistency rules by transactions taking place even beyond the consistency
period.224
Congress passed the consistency requirements to prevent an acquiring
corporation from receiving too much of a tax advantage from a corporate ac-
quisition. Under the law prior to the enactment of Section 338, taxpayers
could obtain a new basis in selected assets of a target company while still
preserving the tax attributes of the target corporation.225 The existence of the
General Utilities doctrine aggravated the revenue loss and shrinkage of the tax
base from selective asset acquisition because the only tax paid by the acquiring
corporation upon electing to step-up the basis of the assets of the target com-
pany was the tax on the recapture items of the target company. 26 Presumably
in later intercorporate distributions, assets could be shifted from company to
company without recognition of gain.
The consistency rules introduce a good deal of complexity into the law,
both for taxpayers and for those administering the law. Also, because the Con-
gress gave the Treasury Department broad authority to prevent avoidance of
the consistency rules by applying the rules beyond the statutory time periods,
taxpayers are subject to some uncertainty about how their acquisitions of
target company assets will be treated even after the end of the statutory con-
sistency period. 27 In addition, the existence of the consistency rules tempts tax-
payers to find ways to avoid them, thereby introducing complexity into the
transactions in an attempt to obtain a cost basis in some assets without
recognizing gain in all corporate assets. 28
The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine makes the consistency rules in
some ways less important than they were before repeal. If the taxpayer
manages to avoid a tax burden on the initial acquisition of a company, the tax
burden will eventually be applied when the property is sold, disposed of, or
distributed. Some commentators, particularly Professor Ginsburg of
Georgetown University Law Center, believe that the consistency rules should
have been repealed with the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.229 Con-
gress, however, has apparently determined that the consistency rules are still
needed after the repeal of the doctrine, because they are retained in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1986.
Tax lawyers devised the mirror transaction to avoid the consistency rules
223I.R.C. § 338(e) (1985), amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 712(k)(3).
224I.R.C. § 338(i)(1) (1985), amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 712(k)(7).
22H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 535-36 (1982).
"
6Ginsburg, supra note 46, at 299.
21See Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 46, 12.06[1][d] at 64.
"'See Ginsburg, supra note 46, at 303-17.
n1d. at 317-19.
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of Section 338, and Congress's inability to decide whether to abolish the mirror
transaction as a part of tax reform illustrates Congress's uncertainty about the
continuing need for the consistency rules. Mirror transactions were devised to
permit acquiring corporations to avoid recognizing the gain inherent in the as-
sets of acquired corporations before disposing of the assets and, incidentally, to
defeat the consistency rules.23 An illustration of the mirror transaction may
prove helpful in explaining its effect."' Assume that A Corp. from our previous
transaction still wants to acquire Sub I and Sub 2 from P Corp. Further, as-
sume that A Corp. still wants to dispose of the assets of Sub I without recog-
nizing the gain inherent in the assets of Sub 2. The consistency rules of Section
338 were specifically designed to prevent A Corp. from accomplishing the step-
up of assets of Sub I alone. A Corp. forms two subsidiary corporations, Sub
A- I and Sub A-2 to acquire Sub I and Sub 2 from P Corp. A Corp., Sub A-I,
and Sub A-2 are now an affiliated group, and A Corp. elects to have the group
file consolidated income tax returns. Sub A-I acquires 50% of the stock of Sub
I and 50% of the stock of Sub 2. Sub A-2 acquires the rest of the stock of Sub I
and of Sub 2. Sub A-I and Sub A-2 are each treated as owning 100% of the
stock of Sub I and of Sub 2 under the consolidated return rules.232 Therefore
Sub I and Sub 2 can be liquidated into Sub A-I and Sub A-2 in a tax-free sub-
sidiary merger. 33 A Corp. causes the assets of Sub I to be transferred to Sub
A-I and causes the assets of Sub 2 to be transferred to Sub A-2 in the liq-
uidation. A Corp. then sells the assets of Sub I to X, an unrelated third party.
A Corp. has managed to acquire and dispose of the assets of Sub I without
recognizing the gain inherent in the Sub I assets. Thus, arguably, the gain in
the Sub I assets should be recognized. On the other hand, the basis in the Sub I
assets has not been stepped-up, and X cannot have the benefit of a higher basis
in the Sub I assets without recognizing the gain inherent in the assets.
Therefore, arguably, A Corp. has not escaped the tax burden of the Sub I
assets; it has merely postponed that gain and shifted it to X.
The mirror transaction apparently works under the law in effect before
the repeal of General Utilities. The principal congressional tax writers have dif-
fered about whether the mirror transaction will continue to work after tax
reform. 34 Representative Rostenkowski, chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, has cogently stated the reasons for the elimination of the
mirror transaction:
New owners of a corporation could sell appreciated corporate property
without a corporate level tax, placing them in a favored position over the
old owners.... Old owners who believed it would be desirable for business
23 Sheppard, Treasury Punts on Mirror Transactions, 33 TAX NOTES 988 (1986).
"'This illustration is patterned after the illustration in Salem, supra note 215, at 4-8.
"'Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-34 (1985).
233.R.C. § 332 (1985).
.. Sheppard, supra note 230, at 988.
(Vol. 4
30
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 4 [1987], Art. 8
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol4/iss1/8
REPEAL OF THE GENERAL UTILITIES DOCTRINE
reasons, and in the best interests of shareholders, to dispose of an ap-
preciated subsidiary could not do so without corporate tax. New owners
could do so if they could use the 'mirror' transaction.23
The mirror transaction does not permit permanent avoidance of corporate
level tax, but it does permit deferral of the gain in the Sub I assets so long as
the corporation purchasing the stock of Sub 1 in the example does not make a
Section 338 election and does not cause the acquired subsidiary to distribute
any of its assets. The perceived danger of the mirror transaction is that the mir-
ror transaction may threaten the consistency rules of Section 338. If corporate
managers arrange the assets of a target company or an affiliated group of com-
panies in separate corporations, or if the managers have the power to divide
the assets into separate corporations through divisive reorganization tech-
niques, corporate managers can avoid the consistency rules at will, at least
with respect to complete businesses.236 Freedom from the consistency rules
makes corporate acquisitions easier. Because the movement for repeal of the
General Utilities doctrine in the House was based on slowing acquisition activ-
ity,237 then, characteristically, the House is also hostile to the mirror transac-
tion.238
Major Senate proponents of tax reform, however, have taken the position
that the mirror transaction survives tax reform. Senators Packwood and Dole
contend that the mirror transaction should not be re-examined without a "full
Treasury review of Subchapter C."239 The split in legislative intent has left the
Treasury Department unable to take a position on the mirror transaction.
Therefore, Treasury will not rule on the validity of the mirror transaction at
this time.24°
Proponents of the mirror transaction argue that no corporate-level gain
should be recognized until the assets of the corporation are distributed or until
some other recognition event occurs.' The real determination that Congress
must make is whether corporate managers should be able to rearrange the
assets of acquired businesses, recognizing gain and stepping up the basis of on-
ly the assets that the manager selects or whether the assets of a whole business
23 Statement of Rep. Rostenkowski (October 2, 1986), quoted in Sheppard, Room Full of Mirrors: Enforcing
General Utilities Repeal, 33 TAX NOTES 281 (1986).
2111d. at 282-83.
237H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 281-82 (1985). See also Sheppard, supra note 186.
23132 CONG. REC. H8358 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1986) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski).
M 132 CONG. REC. S 13958 (daily ed. Sept 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Packwood). See also id. (statement of
Sen. Dole).
1'4Sheppard, supra note 230, at 988. The Treasury Department does plan to prohibit transactions that are
descendants of the mirror transaction that use sales and retention of particular assets from the acquired com-
pany and transactions in which no mirror subsidiaries are created but instead the purchaser merely identifies
gain and loss subs to be disposed of in a certain order. Id.
2
'Faber, Mirror Transactions Are Not Incompatible with General Utilities Repeal, 33 TAX NOTES 397
(1986).
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or group of businesses must be treated consistently. This in turn hinges on
Congress's view of mergers and acquisitions. Permitting the mirror transaction
fosters acquisitions, by permitting avoidance of a significant part of the tax
burden of the acquisition. 242 The result of the repeal of General Utilities will
probably be fewer acquisitions, and certainly less stepping up of basis in ac-
quisitions, than before. 43 The cost of consistency, however, will be complex
rules and continuing litigation over techniques devised by clever tax lawyers to
jump the consistency fence. On grounds of policy, permitting the mirror
transaction is a significant retreat from the premises of tax reform. The policies
underlying corporate tax reform include making the law less dependent on
form, making the tax consequences of transactions less dependent on the skill
of the tax lawyer, and making elections more conscious.2 45 The mirror transac-
tion, an election by form, is certainly inconsistent with these goals.
2. Choice of Business Entity
Taxpayers concerned with the form of their business organization will
find that incorporation is a less favorable alternative after tax reform. Some
commentators have gone so far as to predict, with considerable hyperbole, a
"[p]artnerization of the U.S.A. 2 4 Existing corporations will probably not
dissolve into the partnership form, but new businesses will probably adopt the
form of a partnership or an S corporation more often than in the past.247
With the ordinary corporation tax rules becoming more burdensome, tax-
payers forming business entities will find a higher tax cost for the limited
liability advantages of incorporation. Limited liability is the major non-tax
reason for incorporation, and limited liability is of great concern when the cost
of liability insurance is increasing and liability coverage is sometimes not even
available.4 8 If limited liability is not of concern to the investor, or if limited
liability can be obtained by using a limited partnership or S corporation,
organizers of new businesses will now have a much greater incentive to use
pass-through entities2 9 than before the 1986 tax reform.
As a part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Congress changed several tax
rules that previously encouraged incorporation. Corporations had a slightly
1'
2Sheppard, Mirror Moves: Life Without the General Utilities Rule, TAX NOTES 847 (1986).
14'Thompson, supra note 172, at 1124; Yin, supra note 134, at 1115-16.
'"Faber, supra note 241, at 397. See also Sheppard, supra note 230, at 988.
141See Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 46, § 12.06121[al at 12-65.
2 Salem, supra note 216, at 4-2.
2"Gould, supra note 139, at 149.
2
1
9S corporations and partnerships are pass-through entities, because their income and deduction items are
not taxed at the entity level, but instead pass through, retaining their character, and are taxed at the level of
the shareholder or partner. See I.R.C. §§ 702, 1366 (1986).
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lower tax rate than individuals before tax reform, " ' but the top corporate rates
will be higher after tax reform. 5' Before tax reform, accepted planning called
for businesses that needed to accumulate income for reinvestment in operating
assets to be C corporations because of the lower corporate tax rates.252 While
there may still be income-splitting advantages for using a C corporation in very
small corporations, in larger businesses it may be less expensive to use a pass-
through entity and to distribute sufficient cash to the shareholders or partners
to pay their taxes while accumulating the remaining income in the pass-
through entity.
To avoid trapping appreciated property within the corporation, sharehold-
ers may also retain corporate assets in their own hands and lease them to the
corporation rather than contributing them.253 This will have the helpful side ef-
fect of accumulating income at the shareholder, rather than the corporate,
level. Unfortunately, leasing property to the corporation will probably have
the effect of increasing audits, and perhaps litigation, of leasing transactions.",
Such transactions will also tend to undermine the financial capacity of cor-
porations and will probably impair their ability to obtain credit. 55
In addition, the greater expense of removing property from the corporate
solution after the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine will act as a disincen-
tive for incorporation,256 particularly since the double taxation of corporate
distributions also applies to S corporations for ten years after the S election.257
The repeal of advantageous treatment for capital gains has made the effect of
the repeal of General Utilities even more severe.258 Furthermore, in the
absence of consistency rules, a corporation acquiring assets from a partnership
will not have to recognize the gain in all the assets to acquire some of them. 59
2501.R.C. § 11 (b) (1985) provided for a top corporate rate of 46%, as compared with the top individual rate of
50%. I.R.C. § l(a)-(d) (1985). In addition, the first $100,000 of corporate taxable income was taxed at lower
rates. See I.R.C. § 11 (b) (1985), which provided for a 15% rate on the first $25,000 of taxable income, 18%
for the next $25,000 of taxable income, 30% for the next $25,000 of taxable income, and 40% for the last
$25,000 of taxable income before $100,000.
"I I.R.C. § 1 (a) (1986) provides for tax at 15% for the first $29,750 of taxable income and 28% above that for
married couples filing jointly. In addition, there is a 5 % surcharge above $71,900 of taxable income to phase
out personal exemptions and the 15% rate. I.R.C. § 11 (b) (1986) provides for a 15% rate on the first $50,000
of corporate taxable income, a 25% rate for the next $25,000 of corporate taxable income, and a 34% rate
for all subsequent taxable income, with a 5% surcharge for taxable income above $100,000 to offset the cor-
porate rates below 34%.
252 Bravanec & Lassila, The Choice of Tax Entity for Business Operations, 16 TAX ADVISER 239, 248 (1985).
253REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 1, at 178 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen).
2" Id.
251d.
"'Salem, supra note 215, at 4-28.
1'1.R.C. of 1986, § 1374.
"'The highest tax rate, absent liability for the alternative minimum tax, for a shareholder receiving a
distribution in liquidation of a corporation was 20%. If Congress had repealed the General Utilities doctrine
but retained special treatment for capital gains, the highest possible tax rate on gains recognized on a capital
asset at both levels would have been 42%. Gould, supra note 139, at 147. After tax reform, the tax rate on
such gains will be 52.5%. Salem, supra note 215, at 4-5.
1111d. at 4-25.
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Finally, the partnership form particularly has gained some additional, ancillary
tax advantages over the corporation, such as not being subject to the burden-
some "book income" adjustment rules in the alternative minimum tax.26°
Creating incentives for the formation of pass-through entities, especially
partnerships, has disadvantages for the economy and for taxpayers. The rules
for pass-through entities, and particularly the rules for partnerships, are com-
plex and unfamiliar to many attorneys and tax advisers."' Furthermore, in-
vestors in partnership interests are more subject to the new passive loss lirhita-
tions than are investors in other entities.62 In addition, investments in partner-
ships are usually less marketable than investments in corporations?63
Therefore, the trend toward the creation of partnerships may result in a less
liquid capital market and in less capital formation. 64
Finally, the repeal of General Utilities and the other tax reforms that en-
courage the formation of partnerships may create more difficulty in an already
troubled area, the definition of the corporation for tax purposes. The 1983
Report of the Senate Finance Committee staff included a provision that would
have treated publicly traded master limited partnerships as corporations for tax
purposes.265 The proposal was opposed by the Treasury Department 66 and
other commentators 67 and was not included in the Tax Reform Act. Large
scale shifting to the partnership form, however, could trigger re-examination of
this proposal.
CONCLUSION
It may seem that this corporate tax revision was hastily conceived and
harmful. In fact, in reviewing the consideration of the repeal of General
Utilities, one comes to an opposite conclusion, that the proposal was carefully
216 I.R.C. of 1986, § 56(c)(1), (f), noted in Salem, supra note 215, at 4-25. Salem also states that partnerships
avoid the new "Greenmail" and "Golden Parachute" rules. Id.
61"The distressingly complex and confusing nature of the provisions of subchapter K [the partnership provi-
sions] present a formidable obstacle to the comprehension of these provisions without the expenditure of a
disproportionate amount of time and effort even by one who is sophisticated in tax matters with many years
of experience in the tax field .... Surely a statute has not achieved 'simplicity' when its complex provisions
may confidently be dealt with by at most only a comparatively small number of specialists who have been
initiated into its mysteries." Foxman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 535, 551 n. 9 (1964).
262I.R.C. of 1986, § 469(h)(2).
2 3Nolan, supra note 138, at 101.
264Id.
265REFORM, supra note 14, at 7. One of the principle forces driving this proposal was that the proposed cor-
porate tax changes, especially the repeal of General Utilities "would increase the disparity between the taxa-
tion of partnership and corporate profits and thereby provide incentives for conducting in partnership form
many activities presently conducted by corporations." REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 1, at
63 (statement of Ronald Pearlman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of Treasury).
26 Id.
6 E.g., id. at 108 (statement of Willard B. Taylor for the New York State Bar Association); id. at 135 (state-
ment of Donald Alexander).
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conceived and long studied by those in the best position to know its effects.268
One proponent, after describing the thousands of hours spent in study and the
relatively small constituency for tax reform, feared that efforts at meaningful
corporate tax reform might have been delayed for years had not something
come of the current effort.269 The repeal of the doctrine did close a loophole in
Subchapter C and did achieve some measure of simplification.
The cost of simplification and reform, however, is high. The repeal of
special treatment for capital gains, enacted at the same time as General
Utilities was repealed, was not so carefully considered, and the repeal of capital
gains treatment aggravates almost every problem associated with the changes
to the corporate liquidation rules. The repeal of General Utilities will impose a
severe tax burden on small business with only very limited relief available to
those small corporations. It will also cause taxpayers to engage more frequent-
ly in corporate reorganizations and to organize partnerships rather than cor-
porations. Unfortunately, the demands imposed upon taxpayers and their ad-
visers by using the complex reorganization or partnership rules may more than
offset the simplification benefits of the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
In addition, Congress has left corporate taxation at what one Treasury
Department official has called a "real crossroads.""27 Difficult issues left
unresolved by Tax Reform, such as the mirror transaction and the tax status of
master limited partnerships, threaten the integrity of the corporate income
tax.27' Congress did not take the opportunity to rationalize the reorganization
provisions, and so the problem of taxpayers in that area remains unrelieved.
Also, Congress left the simplification of corporate liquidations incomplete by
failing to repeal the collapsible corporation provisions and by failing to decide
the fate of the consistency requirement in acquisitions.
In summary, the benefits of the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine
were probably oversold, particularly when considered in the context of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. Incomplete tax reform with unexpected additions may
have caused more problems than it solved. Without resolution of the issues of
consistency of treatment of assets in corporate acquisitions (the mirror transac-
tion problem), the tax status of master limited partnerships, revision of the cor-
"'As Senator Dole stated in 1983, "At least one commentator has characterized this project as embryonic.
After 12 months of staff study and public discussion, preceded by a decade of professional discussion, if this
project were embryonic, it would imply a longer gestation period for tax legislation than I have recently
seen." REFORM OF CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Sen. Dole).
269Id. at 138 (statement of Robert Jacobs). Mr. Jacobs expected that the effort would fail if the provisions
were not enacted during the 98th Congress, but the wave of reform apparently survived until the 99th. For
comments in a similar vein about the political difficulties of the reform of Subchapter C, see DeArment, In-
troductory Remarks on the Senate Finance Committee Staffs Final Report on Subchapter C, the Sub-
chapter C Revision Act of 1985, 5 VA. TAX REV. 595, 595-96 (1985).
,J. Roger Mentz, Assistant Secretary of Treasury , Remarks at Ass'n. of American Law Schools Annual
Meeting, reprinted in Sheppard, Law School Conference Examines Tax Reform Policy, 34 TAX NOTES 93,
94 (1987).
271 Id.
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porate reorganization provisions, and repeal of the provisions made obsolete by
the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, corporate tax reform will fail to ac-
complish much of its purpose.
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